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TIIE EPISTEMOLOGICAL GOAL OF
INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGY:
TIIE PERSPECTIVE OF CONS1RUCTIVE REALISM
Kwang-Kuo Hwang

National Taiwan University
Taipei, Taiwan

Since the emergence of indigenous psychology in the 1970s, many
debates about its epistemological goal have taken place between its proponents and mainstream psychologists. In order to settle these debates, it is
necessary to agree on a sound philosophical foundation for the future development of indigenous psychology. The philosophy of constructive realism
advocated by the Vienna School in recent years may provide such a philosophical foundation. In this article, I first review the epistemological challenges faced by indigenous psychologists. I argue that tl1ese challenges and
ilieir solution should be understood in tl1e context of tl1e modernization of
non-Western countries. Then I illustrate the main ideas of constructive realism. Finally, I explain how the philosophy of constructive realism can be
used to meet the epistemological challenges encountered by indigenous
psychologists.

The Emergence oflndigenous Psychology
Since the encl of the 1970s, a number of psychologists have begun to
advocate an indigenous approach to psychology in non-Western countries
such as Mexico (Diaz-Guerrero, 1977), Korea (Kwon, 1979),Japan (Azuma
& Imada, 1994), the Philippines (Church, 1984; Enriquez, 1977; Lagmay,
1984), India (Sinha, 1986), and Taiwan (Yang, 1997). In the early 1990s,
the Communist countries of Eastern Europe collapsed, the long-lasting
Cold War between the East and West after World War II came to an encl,
and various forms of ethnic conflict broke out all over the world. The clash
of civilizations became a major issue in the new age of globalization
(Huntington, 1996). Parallel to these developments, an indigenous psychology movement has spread to many areas of the world and attracted
increasing attention from mainstream psychologists (Shiraev & Levy, 2001).
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Generally speaking, the emergence of indigenous psychology in nonWestern countries has been inspired by a spirit of nationalism and anticolonialism. Most psychologists in non-Western countries adopt conceptual frameworks and research methods developed by Western psychologists when conducting research in their native societies (Kao & Sinha,
1997; Mehryar, 1984; Sinha, 1986). Their research findings may be irrelevant to the psychology of the local people, and thus are unable to solve
problems faced in people's daily lives. The problem of implantation may
be most serious in the case of social psychology. Most knowledge in this
field has been developed in the United States. American psychologists
usually focus on issues relevant to their home society both as research
topics and as the framework for theoretical construction (Moscovici, 1972).
Four levels of ethnocentric bias are therefore likely in Western psychological research Werry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002):
1.

2
3.
4.

Selection of items and stimuli in an instrument.
Choice of instruments and procedures.
Definition of theoretical concepts.
Choice of topic for research.

As a consequence, findings derived from replicating Western research
paradigms might be ill'elevant to or inadequate for understanding the
mentality of people in non-Western countries (Sinha, 1986, 1988). The
imposition of a Western research paradigm on non-Western countries can
be viewed as a kind of cultural imperialism or colonialism (Ho, 1998). By
ignoring the fact that many Western theories of social psychology are
culturally bound, duplication of a Western paradigm in non-Western countries may result in neglect of cultural factors that may influence the development and manifestation of human behavior.
Based on such reasoning, many indigenous psychologists advocate "a
bottom-up model building paradigm" (Kim, 2000, p. 265); promote "the
study of human behavior and mental processes within a cultural context
that relies on values, concepts, belief systems, methodologies, and other
resources" (Ho, 1998, p. 94); and treat people "as interactive and proactive
agents of their own actions" that occur in a meaningful context (Kim, Park
& Park, 2000, p. 71). They perform "the scientific study of human behavior
(or the mind) that is native, that is not transported from other regions, and
that is designed for its peoples" (Kim & Beny, 1993, p. 2) in order to
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develop a "cultural-appropriate psychology" (Azuma, 1984, p.53); "a psychology based on and responsive to indigenous culture and indigenous
realities" (Enriquez, 1993, p.158); or a psychology whose "concepts, problems, hypothesis, methods, and test emanate from, adequately represent,
and reflect upon the cultural context in which the behavior is observed"
(Adair, Puhan & Vohra, 1993, p.149).
Challenges to Indigenous Psych o logy

The approach of indigenous psychology just described has been criticized by mainstream psychologists. For example, Triandis (2000) pointed
out that anthropologists have used a similar approach for years, and that
accumulating anthropological data with an idiosyncratic approach may
not have much significance in terms of contribution to the development of
scientific psychology.
Poortinga (1999) indicated that an internal contradiction for development of indigenous psychology is implied in the usage of plural "indigenous psychologies" by many indigenous psychologists. The development
of multiple psychologies not only contradicts the scientific requirement of
parsimony, but also makes the demarcation of cultural populations an
unresolved problem. If every culture has to develop its own psychology, how
many indigenous psychologies should there be? How many psychologies
would have to be developed for Africa' What is the optimal number of
indigenous psychologies? What is the meaning of an indigenous psychology developed in a specific culture to people in other cultures?
David Ho is a supporter of indigenous psychology and has advocated
for the development of an Asian psychology (1988) with warnings that
blindly transporting the research paradigms of Western psychology into
non-Western countries may lead to the trap of Western ethnocentrism.
However, he has also pointed out that if eve,y culture develops its own
psychology, another kind of ethnocentrism in reverse would arise. Poortinga
0996) made similar criticism on this point. He argued that over-emphasis
on the nature and extent of differences in psychological functioning between people of different cultures may make indigenous psychology a
kind of "scientific ethnocentrism in a new guise."
Hermans and Kempen 0998) proposed the concept of "moving culture," which is changing continually over time, and discussed the perilous
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problems of cultural dichotomies in a globalizing society When intercultural communications become so frequent that the whole world is a
global village, can culture be regarded as internally homogenous and
externally distinctive? If individuals are able to choose and decide their
own behavior, culture may have no necessary influence on the individual;
psychological traits and mechanisms would be incidental. The notion of
regarding culture as a psychological system becomes less feasible. Instead
of regarding culture as a stable system geographically located in a particular area, it would be more viable to define cross-cultural differences in
terms of specific ecocultural and sociocultural conditions (Poortinga, 1999).
Poortinga 0999, p. 425) strongly suggested that "differences in behavioral repertoires across cultural populations should be understood against
the background of a broader frame of commonness." He argued that overemphasis on cross-cultural differences in behaviors and negation of important invariance in psychological functioning across different cultures is not
only "factually incorrect," but also "theoretically misleading" (Poortinga,
1999, p. 419).
Philosophical Foundation of Indigenous Psychology
In order to meet the challenge of multiple indigenous psychologies,
many indigenous psychologists have argued that the final goal of indigenous psychology is to develop an Asian psychology (Ho, 1998), a global
psychology (Enriquez, 1993; K. S. Yang, 1993, 2000), a human psychology
(K. S. Yang, 1993), or a universal psychology (Berry & Kim, 1993). A careful
examination of the controversial debates between indigenous psychologists and mainstream psychologists reveals that both camps concentrate
their arguments on the issue of the epistemological goal for the development of indigenous psychology. A persuasive discourse to settle all related
debates could not be provided if arguments are restricted only to the
epistemological level.
In my article "Constructive Realism and Confucian Relationalism: An
Epistemological Strategy for Developing Indigenous Psychology" I argued
that there are three levels of breakthroughs to be made for the development
of an indigenous psychology, namely, philosophical reflection, theoretical
construction, and empirical research. On the level of philosophical reflection, indigenous psychologists should propose a philosophy that is able to
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explain the essential difference between knowledge constructed by scientists after the 14"' Century European Renaissance and that which was developed by people of non-European cultures during the course of their
long histories. The goal of this philosophical reflection should be able to
answer the following questions:
1.

2.
3.

4.

What is the meaning of modernization?
What is the meaning of modernization to non-Western societies'
Why has the movement of indigenous psychology emerged in many
non-Western countries when the scientific communities of the world
are dominated by Western psychology?
What kind of knowledge ought non-Western psychologists to pursue
as scientists?

In other words, the emergence of the indigenous psychology movement can be concep~alized as a reaction by non-Western scholars against
the blind imposition of Western paradigms on research conducted in indigenous societies. It is inspired by a spirit of nationalism or anti-colonialism. In order to settle debates about the epistemological goals of indigenous psychology, it is necessary to explain its occurrence in a broader
context that illuminates the modernization of non-Western societies.
It seems to me that Western modernization has been characterized
and supported by a special kind of knowledge constructed on the basis of
philosophy of science. Two years ago, I published a book titled The Logic
of Social Science that systematically presented major contributions of 17
major Western philosophers of the 20"' century to the progress of philosophy of science with respect to their viewpoints on ontology, epistemology,
and methodology (Hwang, 2001). The book contains five parts: (a) positivism, (b) post-positivism, (c) structuralism, (d) hern1eneutics, and (e) critical
theory. The last chapter concludes with the philosophy of constructive
realism. The theme of the first two parts of the book, positivism and postpositivism, is the philosophy of science mairily applied to natural science.
Because psychology has traditionally been defined as a branch of science
by Western psychologists, tl1is philosophy of science is also used by many
psychologists. The last three parts of the book, dealing with structuralism,
hermeneutics and critical theory, contain paradigms frequently used by
social scientists. Constructive realism is discussed in the last chapter as a
philosophy of science and is proposed with an attempt to integrate its
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previous development by Dr. Fritz Wallner, who organized the Vienna
School, (not to be confused with the Vienna Circle, which was active in the
world scientific community in 1930s) (Wallner, 1994; Slunecko, 1997).
Constructive realism classifies reality into three categories: reality itself (wirklichkeit), lifeworld, and microworld. Reality itself is something
that cannot be understood by human beings. Human beings can understand only the worlds they have constructed with language, which include
the /ifeworlds constructed by cultural groups in their long development,
and the scientific microworlds constructed by individual scientists.

Two Types of Knowledge in the Scientific Microworld
and the Lifeworld
The separation of the knowable world into lifeworld and scientific
microworld is very helpful for coping with the challenges encountered by
indigenous psychologists, although Wallner's description of these two worlds
is not clear enough to answer the aforementioned questions with regard to
indigenous psychology. For this reason, I have reviewed previous discourses on the difference between the types of knowledge constructed in
the lifeworld and the microworld (Hwang, 2000), and compared them on
five concerns, namely, the constructor, ways of thinking, types of rationality, patterns of construction, and functions of worldview (see Table 1).
Table 1
Two Types ofKnowledge in Lifeworld and Scientific Microworld

Constructor

Lifeworld

Scientific Microworld

Cultural group

Single scientist

Ways of thinking

Originative thinking

Technique thinking

Types of rationality

Substantive rationality

Formal rationality

Patterns of construction

Participative constructive Dominative construction

Functions of worldview

Meaning of life

Recognition of world
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The microworld of scientific knowledge is constructed by a single
scientist, while the language and knowledge used by people in their
lifeworlds is constructed by a group of people living with the same cultural
background for a long period oftime. In the originating years of a particular culture, people concenlnte themselves on observing the external world
and contemplating the nature of every object in the lifeworld. They try
their best to make every thing manifest itself in the language they create to
represent it. Heidegger labeled this way of thinking originative thinking or
essential thinking (1966). In contrast, the language used by scientists to
construct microworlds of scientific knowledge is intentionally created to
reach a specific goal. 111e language has a compulsory and aggressive character that demands the most gain with the least cost, and is a product of
technical thinking or metaphysical thinking from Heidegger's perspective.
From the perspectives of insiders living in a given society, collective
consciousness and social representations are all rational (Durkhein1, 1912/
1965). But there is a fundamental difference between the rationality used
for constructing a scientific microworld and that used in a lifeworld. In
their lifeworlds, people emphasize the importance of substantive rationality, which refers to the value of ends or results judged from a particular
position. It is completely different from the formal rationality for constructing scientific rnicroworlds used by Western scientists after the European Renaissance. Formal rationality emphasizes the importance of goals
or results and provides no clear-cut means and procedures for reaching
them. Only a few persons who are familiar with the special means and
procedures can use them to pursue worthy goals. Substantive rationality
pays attention only to value-neutral facts and the calculability of means
and procedures that can be used by everyone to pursue their personal
goals (Brubaker, 1984).
Scientists construct their microworlds using Cartesian dualism through
dominative construction (Shen, 1994). They construct these scientific
microworlds about various aspects of their external world that concern
human beings in order to attain the goal of controlling and utilizing nature.
These scientific microworlds are neither pern1anent nor absolutely certain;
each has its own specific goal. When the goal loses importance, or when
people are faced with new problems, scientists must construct new
microworlds to address these problems. In contrast, people constructed
knowledge in their lifeworlds by participative construction, especially in
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pre-modern civilizations. Anthropologist Levy-Bruh] 0910/ 1966) indicated
that the cultural systems of primitive people are constituted on the law of
mystical participation, which conceptualizes human beings and nature as
parts of an inseparable entity that can be viewed as a consciousness of
cosmic holism (Taylor, 1871/ 1929).
The worldviews of the lifeworld and the scientific microworld are
essentially different. As people of a given culture contemplate the nature
of the universe and the situation of humankind, they gradually formulate
their worldviews with original thinking in the course of their histrny.
Walsh and Middleton 0984) indicated that a worldview thus formulated
usually answers four broad categories of questions: Who am I? What is my
situation of life? Why do I suffer? How do I find salvation? Generally
speaking, a worldview describes not only human nature but also the
relationship between an individual and the external environment, as well
as the individual's historical situation in the world. In addition, it provides
a diagnosis for problems and prescribes a recipe for their solution.
The worldview in a scientific microworld does not serve such a function. In his lexicon theory, Kuhn 0987) indicated that the scientific lexicon
is composed of a set of terms with structure and content. Scientists use
terms in the lexicon to make propositions in theory for describing the
nature of the world. Theory and lexicon are inseparable. The microworld
of a theory cannot be understood without its specific lexicon. Different
theories are understood with their various lexicons. When a theory is
changed, its lexicon will change with it. Each lexicon contains a method
to recognize the world. Members of the same scientific community must
master the same lexicon, understand the meanings of each term, and share
the same worldview in order to communicate with one another. In order
to think about the same problem and engage in related research in the
same scientific community, they must share the same worldview. However, the worldview of a scientific microworld provides no answers to
problems related to the meaning of life. It is essentially different from the
worldview of a lifeworld.
The contrast between the two types of knowledge in a scientific
microworld and a lifeworld provides answers to the questions mentioned
in Section III. In the following sections, I propose my answers to those
questions. The first issue I discuss is the meaning of modernization.
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Modernization and Social Change
In Western countries, scientific microworlds are mainly those that
evolved from the interior of the civilization and were utilized for various
types of production after the European Renaissance in the 14'h Century.
T11e implications of social change in the process of modernization can be
elaborated in terms of the theory of communicative action proposed by
Habermas (1978). According to Habermas, an individual's lifeworld is
composed of three aspects, namely, culture, society and individual. For
the aspect of culture, people sharing a certain cultural heritage may share
the power of re-interpreting it, and determine the way of interpreting it
through intersubjective communicative actions. For the aspect of society,
communication may help people to establish standards of behavior, reinforce their identification with the community, and strengthen the integration of society. For the aspect of the individual, growth resulting from
constant communic~tion and learning may enable an individual to improve capacity for action and help to shape the integrity of personality.
Social systems in modern societies have evolved from people's
lifeworlds through the process of rationalization. However, such newly
differentiated social systems as university, industrial factory, or commercial organization are not only different from people's lifeworlds, but also
antagonistic to each other. The three functions of communication in an
individual's lifeworld are mutual understanding, coordination of action,
and socialization. These functions of communication may satisfy three
kinds of individual social needs, namely cultural reproduction, social integration, and individual socialization. However, the major goal for sustaining most social systems in modern society is material reproduction,
and the criterion for evaluating system evolution is the enhancement of
social control. In order to achieve this goal, each system must try to search
for or develop the most efficient microworld for material reproduction.
People working in the system have to use technical thinking to solve the
problems they encounter in their production work. In order to attain this
goal, money and power replace the position of language in the lifeworld
and become the major media for system integration. Seeking consensus
through communication and coordination may also take into consideration the one-dimensional thinking of reward and punishment. Systems in
the lifeworld are liberated from the regulation of social norms, and be-
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come more and more autonomous. Finally, the imperatives of social system begin to instrumentalize the lifeworld. Habermas (1978) called this
process colonization of the lifeworld by the social system.
Modernization of Non-Western Societies

Modernization of non-Western countries is fundamentally different
from that of Western countries. TI1e modernization process of Western
countries has been facilitated by various factors and evolved mainly from
their cultural traditions, while the modernization of non-Western countries
is induced by factors external to the culture. In the process of modernization
for non-Western countries, people also have to differentiate various social
systems from their lifeworlds, such as schools, factories, research institutes,
and use various microworlds of scientific knowledge to engage in different
types of production work. However, because this kind of knowledge is
transplanted from a foreign culture, when terms in those lexicons are
translated into the local language, they are obviously distinct from the
native language used by the local people in their daily lives. It is not
difficult for local people to tell the difference between foreign language
and their own culture.
Because rnicroworlds of scientific knowledge have the character of
instrumental rationality, people usually learn it in school, and only professionals can use them systematically to do production work in various
social systems. It is a matter of course that this kind of knowledge may
penetrate into the lifeworlds of ordinary people through various channels
of communication. However, for most non-professionals, though they may
learn scientific knowledge fragmentally and use it in daily life, it remains
at the level of common sense. It is very hard for ordinary people to utilize
such knowledge systematically and engage in production work as a professional does.
Also, because scientific knowledge has the character of instrumental
rationality, it is different from substantial rationality in nature. It can neither be used as a guide for an individual's value orientation, nor to answer
problems about the meaning of life. In many circumstances, it cannot
replace knowledge learned from cultural traditions, such as values, view
of life, philosophy of life, ethics, or morality. People in non-Western societies certainly use the various microworlds of scientific knowledge that
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they learned in school to engage in production work in the social system.
But, they may also utilize the knowledge inherited from their cultural
tradition to deal with problems in their lifeworlds. Thus, they may have
different types of knowledge in their cognitive system, some originated
from Western culture, and some inherited from their own cultural tradition. People retrieve the most appropriate knowledge from their cognitive
system to solve a particular problem faced in a given life situation. Of
course, it is quite possible that even the individuals themselves would not
be able to identify where the knowledge originated from in most situations.
This combination of types of knowledge is the most important reason
for psychologists of non-Western countries to develop indigenous psychology. So far as this point is concerned, the concept of domain-specific
cultural theories proposed by Hong, Morris, Chiu, and Veronica (2000) is
of particular importance. In other words, cultural theories originated from
various cultural traditions are applicable in specific domains only (Yang,
1988). In a particular domain of life, one may utilize microworlds of
scientific knowledge to engage in production work, while in other domains, one may instead use knowledge originating from one's own cultural
tradition to solve the problem. One of the missions for non-Western psychologists in developing indigenous psychology is to clarify what the most
appropriate cultural theory is that can be used in a specific situation by
people of a given cultural group.
The Epistemological Goal of Indigenous Psychology

If this philosophical reflection is acceptable, the philosophy of constructive realism provides an answer to previous debates about the epistemological goal of indigenous psychology. In all cultures one of the most
thoroughly investigated subjects is human beings themselves. During the
process of cultural development, each cultural group develops various
cultural theories of "psychology" to deal with the problems that their
members may come across in their daily lives. Therefore, indigenous psychologists call for studying the psychological processes of local people as
mediated by their native language in their lifeworlds. Mainstream psychologists do not oppose this claim, but they emphasize the importance of
constructing microworlds of psychological knowledge and argue that "dif-
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ferences in behavioral repertoires across cultural populations should be
understood against the background of a broader frame of commonness"
(Poortinga, 1999, p. 425).
From the perspective of constructive realism, a solution for indigenous psychologists to resolve the debate is to construct formal theories (or
microworlds) about the psychological functioning of the human mind that
are supposed to be universal, and then use these theories to analyze the
particular mentality of a people in their lifeworlds with moving culture.
In order to attain this goal, indigenous psychologists in non-Western
countries must admit that the philosophy of science containing the rules of
the game for constructing microworlds of scientific knowledge is mainly a
product of Western civilization. If they want to construct such microworlds,
they have to transform their attitudes from anti-colonialism to post-colonialism, make themselves familiar with the Western philosophy of science, and utilize the most appropriate paradigm to solve the various academic problems they may encounter in attaining the epistemological goal
of indigenous psychology.
Conclusion
Based on this framework, I have developed a series of theoretical
models of Confucian relationalism over the past twenty years. First, I
constructed a formal model of Face and Favor on the basis of scientific
realism (Hwang, 1987), and then used this model as a framework to
analyze the deeper structure of Confucianism (Hwang, 1995, 2001). Even
colleagues who support the indigenous approach often ask me whether
the cultural tradition of Confucianism still exists under the impact of Western culture, and whether it is necessary to study Confucianism as a cultural
system from the perspective of psychology. It is not difficult to see that such
inquiries are proposed on the concept of moving culture. In responding to
these kinds of questions, I emphasize that theoretical models about the
deep structure of Confucianism are just microworlds constructed by a social
scientist. They are cultural structures, but not psychological structures.
Viewed from the perspective of structuralism, they are an unconscious
model universal to all people in Confucian culture, but not a conscious
model particular to any individual (Levi-Strauss, 1976). In people's actual
lives, it is very hard to find any person who has the exact mentality as
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described by the deep structure of a culture. However, such a structure can
be used as a "broader frame of commonness" (Poortinga, 1999, p. 425) to
study not only the social behaviors of people from Confucian societies, but
also across various cultural populations.
To be more specific, under the influence of Confucianism, people of
East Asian societies have developed various language games for human
practice or activity shared by their cultural group, such as cheong in Korean (Choi, Kim & Kim,1999; Choi & Choi, 2001), amae in Japanese (Doi,
1973; Yamaguchi & Ariizumi, 2001) or renqing in Chinese (Hwang, 1987).
These language games represent Confucian forms of life, which can be
regarded as the surface structure derived from the deep structure of Confucianism, or as cultural theories to be used in some specific domains of
life by East Asian people. People in contemporary East Asian societies may
or may not use these cultural theories in their lifeworlds. However, comprehension of this deep structure enables study of the unique feature of the
Confucian mentality against the background of the universal structures of
the human mind. By using this framework, empirical research may be
conducted for the future development of indigenous psychology.
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